In the introduction, the author points out that aggression based on religion is not new. The UN’s Genocide Convention defines the term as an atrocity against the masses, but the author points out that it provides no means for genocide prevention. In her understanding, because of the preventive matter of the Convention, no one should wait until genocide is in progress before acting.
The author asks in the succeeding chapter if nations must define the term for genocide to enable them to act.  Responding to the question, she clarifies that the definition of genocide differs from the courts’ point of view and the optic of the state. The author proceeds to research the latter. In so doing, she condemns the Convention on Genocide, stating that it doesn’t force the individual nations to define it themselves. This, she believes, would be crucial to achieving prevention, which is the convention’s goal.

Even though the International Court of Justice sets criteria for genocide, its jurisdictions are limited.

The chapter on accepted genocide, which is the reaction of a country to mass atrocities, analyses the obligations from the international law of the USA, Canada, the Netherlands and the UK in the face of atrocities committed against religious minorities by ISIS in Syria and Iraq. Since 2014, even with real proof of what was happening, the countries could only stop the atrocities, but they couldn’t prevent them and therefore couldn’t fulfil their obligations stated in the Convention.

In her hypothesis, the writer asserts that to prevent genocide, countries must define what qualifies as genocide, ensuring that a monitoring mechanism and early warning analysis is a precondition.